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Abstract: Theories of European integration suggest that supranational institutions of the 
European Union are the central and driving force behind European integration. These theories 
imply that member states will in practice comply with European Union legislation. Thus, 
compliance rates should be comparable across all member states. Contrary to this premise, 
however, data suggests that rates of compliance vary significantly between the member states. 
Although nearly all member states typically have a high level of compliance on an annual basis, 
there is still variation in compliance rates even among the less Eurosceptic member states. What 
explains the variations in compliance rates between member states? This thesis posits that the 
more veto players a member state contains; the less likely they are to comply with the European 
Union.  
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Introduction 
By many accounts, it is clear that the EU has an implementation ‗deficit‘. Often measures 
adopted by the Union are not applied correctly or even not applied at all by many of its twenty-
seven member states. This is a serious dilemma that plagues policy-making in the European 
Union today. Indeed, as expressed by the European Commission (charged with ensuring that 
member states comply with implementing EU measures) in its Strategic Objectives for 2005-
2009, ―failure to apply European legislation on the ground damages the effectiveness of Union 
policy and undermines the trust on which the Union depends. The perception that ‗we stick to the 
rules but others don‘t‘, wherever it occurs, is deeply damaging to a sense of European 
solidarity…prompt and adequate transposition and vigorous pursuit of infringements are critical 
to the credibility of European legislation and the effectiveness of policies.‖1 
For this thesis, I attempt to assess the levels of non-compliance and provide an 
explanation as to why variations exist between member states in the broader context of 
compliance and the power of domestic institutions over supranational ones. Based on the data for 
the years I examine (1997-2008), significant variation exists among EU member states in regards 
to compliance, which suggests that domestic institutions trump the influence of supranational 
policy pressures and forces when it comes to implementing and applying EU law. We might 
expect that European member states that are more Eurosceptic would be less inclined to comply 
with EU directives. Based on traditional theories of European integration such as 
Neofuctionalism, Intergovernmentalism, and most recently, Europeanization, we might also 
expect that as supranational institutions become more powerful over time, variations should be 
minimized. My hypothesis, however, is that the problem lies at the institutional level within 
                                                        
1
 ―Strategic Objectives 2005 – 2009: Europe 2010: A Partnership for European Renewal 
Prosperity, Solidarity and Security‖.  
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member states, as the number of veto players determines whether it is more compliant or not. 
EU Policy-Making and Compliance 
As a legislative act of the EU, regulations become enforceable immediately as law in all 
member states simultaneously. In this sense, regulations are equivalent to ―Acts of Parliament‖. 
Though not required to be mediated into national legislation by each member state, but they are 
nonetheless technically binding and are on par with national laws.
2
 The Council of Ministers can 
delegate legislative authority to the Commission, which in effect allows both institutions to 
create regulations. 
In addition to regulations, directives are legislative acts of the EU that require member 
states to achieve a particular policy result without overtly dictating the means to achieve the 
policy change. Unlike regulations, however, directives must be mediated into national law by 
means of implementing the measure in each member state. Similar to the creation of directives, 
the Council of Ministers can delegate legislative authority to the Commission, which in effect 
allows both institutions to create directives.  
When directives are adopted by the EU, they must be implemented within a certain 
timeframe by each member state. On occasion, the laws of member states may already comply 
with what is stipulated in the directive, which simply means that the member states keep their 
own individual laws in place. More commonly, however, member states are required to change 
their own domestic laws in order to comply with the existing directive. The process by which 
this occurs is known as transposition, in which member states give force to a directive by passing 
                                                        
2
 From the  EU Commission: ―Regulations are the most direct form of EU law - as soon as they are passed, they 
have binding legal force throughout every Member State, on a par with national laws. National governments do not 
have to take action themselves to implement EU regulations. They are different from directives, which are addressed 
to national authorities, who must then take action to make them part of national law, and decisions, which apply in 
specific cases only, involving particular authorities or individuals. Regulations are passed either jointly by the EU 
Council and European Parliament, and by the Commission alone.‖ 
http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/introduction/what_regulation_en.htm  
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appropriate implementation measures. Transposition is completed either by primary or secondary 
legislation, and the effective implementation of directives within the set time frame of two years 
typically depends on factors related to the administrative, legal, and legislative systems of the 
member states. The Commission closely scrutinizes the timing and correctness of the 
transposition process for each member state. If a member state fails to pass the required national 
legislation that incorporates the directive into domestic law, or if the enacted legislation does not 
comply with the requirements of the directive, the Commission has the right to initiate legal 
action against the member state in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). As of 2008, nearly 1,298 
such cases were heard before the Court.   
Indeed, according to the 2004 annual report of the ECJ, the Commission initiated 193 
proceedings against member states for violations of compliance. During the same year, the Court 
found in 144 cases out of a total of 155 that member states had failed to fulfill their obligations 
when implementing directives. Thus, in more than ninety percent of cases the Commission 
referred to the Court of Justice, the Court declared that the Commission had a reasonable right to 
take action against one or more member states. In determining why a member state is compliant 
or not, the issue is often broad and has many different aspects—legal, political, institutional 
(administrative), and economic. A member state deemed non-compliant may be a) unwilling to 
comply (i.e., domestic political opposition), b) unable to comply (i.e., legal and administrative 
obstacles), c) lack the lack of human and material resources needed to comply, or d) simply 
unaware of its obligations to do so (Talberg, 2002, 609-643).  
One of the fundamental principles of the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 that created 
the union that exists today is the principle of the ‗loyalty‘ of Member States to the Community 
through prompt compliance with its rules. Article 10 of the Maastricht Treaty provides that 
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―member states shall take all appropriate measures…to ensure fulfillment of the obligations 
arising out of this Treaty… they shall facilitate the achievement of the Community tasks [and]… 
they shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of 
this Treaty.‖3 Despite the fundamental principles outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, which 
provides the current foundation for the contemporary framework for today‘s European Union, 
the European Commission annually initiates hundreds of proceedings against member states 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in an effort to induce them to comply with their 
obligations.  
 As the executive body of the EU, the appointed European Commission is charged with 
proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding Union treaties, and the daily operation 
of the institution. Since the Commission alone has the power of legislative initiative, no other 
institution (i.e., Council of Ministers and the Parliament) can make formal proposals for 
legislation. The Commission‘s powers in proposing law have typically centered around 
economic regulation and have often propose stricter legislative requirements than the member 
states themselves. In this sense, the Commission operates as a supranational institution, in which 
decision-making is transferred or delegated to a central authority by governments of the member 
states (McCormick, 2005).  
 As the principal decision-making institution of the EU, the Council of Ministers is one of 
two bodies that, along with the European Parliament, shares legislative authority. Composed of 
the twenty-seven national ministers from the member states, the presidency of the Council 
rotates every six months to set an agenda. Some of its decisions are made by qualified majority 
voting and others are by unanimity. In most policy areas, the Council of Ministers and the 
                                                        
3
 Article 10 of the Maastricht Treaty. (February 1992.). http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html  
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Parliament share legislative and budgetary powers equally.   
 The European Council consists of the group of heads of state or government in the 
member states and is responsible for the general policy direction and priorities of the Union. In 
this sense, the Council is an example of Intergovernmentalism in which the decision-making 
power is solely vested with the governments of the member states. Although the Council has no 
formal legislative power, the institution typically deals with issues of importance to the entire 
Union and meets four times a year in Brussels.  
 The European Parliament (EP) shares the legislative as well as budgetary authority of the 
EU with the Council of Ministers. All 736 members of the EP are elected directly by the voters 
in the twenty-seven individual member states every five years. As such, the EP is the only 
directly elected body to the EU. In the broader context of the institutional structure of the EU, the 
EP acts as a partner with the Council and Commission, although its legislative initiative powers 
are limited in some policy areas.   
 To the extent member states have variations in compliance, how best can that be 
explained? In order to answer this question, I give an outline of the theoretical approaches 
associated with Neofunctionalism, Intergovernmentalism, and Europeanization and how they can 
help account for the compliance of member states. Following that, an outline of the veto player 
theory will be given, showing how it is applicable to the hypothesis — namely, the more veto 
players a member state has, the less likely it is to be compliant then, the infringement data 
analyzed followed, by a conclusion examining the policy implications of non-compliance.  
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I. Theorizing Member State Compliance  
Neofuctionalism was the original theoretical approach to understanding European 
integration. It suggests that supranational institutions have been the driving force behind 
European integration, which has allowed for an expanded mandate of EU legislation across more 
diverse policy areas (Cini, 2003). Therefore, since member states are likely to heed this 
expanded mandate, they should behave in a way that would suggest compliance with the EU. As 
a component of integration, compliance acts as a bond between the supranational levels of power 
in Brussels and Strasbourg and the domestic capitals in each member state. If a member state is 
not compliant, further integration is therefore hindered. Neofuctionalists use the concept of 
spillover to provide an explanation as to why national governments take steps towards 
integration, and get swept further along than they anticipate (Lindberg, 1963, 10). In other 
words, the notion that integration in one policy area creates opportunities or problems that can 
only be resolved or exploited by further integration in other policy areas. Two distinct types of 
spillover are suggested. First, functional spillover argues that modern industrial economies 
consist of interconnected components and therefore one sector can not be isolated from another. 
The Neofuctionalist argument states that, if member states integrate one ‗functional‘ sector of 
their own economy, the interconnected sector would inevitably lead to ‗spillover‘ in additional 
sectors, which would prompt integration, since all sectors would need to be integrated in order to 
work with each other (George and Bache, 2001, 10-11). 
In addition, the Neofuctionalists added the idea of political spillover to explain the 
process of integration. In essence, political spillover is the culmination of political pressures in 
favor of further integration within the member states involved since functional integration 
requires shared decision-making. Once a particular component of the economy of a member state 
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was integrated, interest groups operating in that particular sector have to exert political pressure 
at the supranational level (Cini, 2003). Once interest groups switch the focus of their activity to 
the European level, they would come to appreciate the benefits available to them as a result of 
integration of their own sector. Additionally, these interest groups would also become aware of 
the barriers that would prevent benefits of further integration from being fully realized. The main 
barrier would be that integration in one sector would as a whole not be effective without the 
integration of other sectors, and therefore, interest groups would become advocates for further 
integration. The mere fact that functional or political spillover may take place implies that 
compliance should not be an issue for individual member states (George and Bache, 2001, 10-
11). Therefore, the theory of Neofuctionalism would not suggest great variation in compliance 
rates among member states.  
The theory of Intergovernmentalism, associated above all with Stanley Hoffmann (1964, 
1966), was a counter-argument against Neofuctionalism and other supranational approaches to 
integration. In its essence, Intergovernmentalism suggests that member state governments retain 
full sovereignty over integration, and thus the policy decisions made at the supranational level 
(e.g., in the Councils) are often but not always made by unanimity or at least reflect national 
interests. European integration had to be viewed in a global context, as regional integration was 
only one component of the development of the global international system. Hoffmann argued 
that the Neofuctionalists neglected to do this, as they focused on the internal dynamics of the 
European Community itself, rather than the dynamics of the international community at large. 
Indeed, the Neofuctionalists implied that international conditions would remain fixed. 
Intergovernmentalism also stipulated that national governments were just as powerful actors in 
the process of European integration, as they were the ones that controlled the nature and pace of 
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integration at large. Intergovernmentalism rejected the Neofuctionalist notion that governments 
would be overwhelmed by the pressures from interest groups to integrate. In this sense, regional 
integration was not a self-contained domestic process, but rather influenced by a wider 
international context. In addition, member states are uniquely powerful actors because they 
themselves possess formal sovereignty and democratic legitimacy and integration in ‗low‘ 
political sectors would not necessarily spillover into ‗high‘ political sectors. Despite this, 
intergovernmentalism does acknowledge that actors other than national governments play a role 
in the process of integration, although national governments are the key decision-makers and 
have much more autonomy than in the Neofuctionalist view. Therefore, Intergovernmentalism 
would suggest that once measures are agreed to at the Council level, implementation should be 
unproblematic in adopting non-controversial measures that do not negatively impact the formal 
sovereignty and domestic legitimacy that member states possess. Based on this perspective, 
Intergovernmentalism could even suggest general compliance among member states, albeit less 
so than Neofuctionalism.  
Among political scientists, there is also an increasing focus on the impact 
Europeanization has on the domestic systems of governance in EU member states. Simply, the 
concept of Europeanization refers to the process by which EU political and economic dynamics 
become a component of the policy-making of member states. In other words, Europeanization is 
an explanation of how integration takes place, unlike Neofuctionalism and Intergovernmentalism 
which seeks to explain why integration takes place. Once integration occurs, Europeanization can 
help explain the convergence of national policy processes and policy outcomes. The 
implementation of EU directives is one of the many examples of the broader phenomenon of 
Europeanization (Falkner, Treib, et al, 2005, 11). This perspective has produced numerous 
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studies directly dealing with the question of the impact membership in the EU  has on domestic 
institutions such as parliaments (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Raunio and 
Hix, 2001), party systems (Ladrech 2001; Mair 2001), administrations (Olsen 2002), and state-
society relationships (Schmidt 1999; Falkner 2000). In addition to the study and analysis of the 
impact of membership, there has been close scrutiny of the patterns of adjustment to European 
policies, in particular, the national implementation of EU law. In this sense, implementation 
refers to the transposition of European legislation into domestic law, as well as to the 
enforcement of all legal provisions, both of which influence proper and correct application in the 
member states themselves. In the compliance literature, particular attention is paid towards 
directives, which as noted earlier, do not have direct effect in national law, but require legislative 
enactment (Falkner, Treib, et al, 2004, 452-473). Unlike regulations passed by the EU in which 
direct effect is limited at best, directives must be incorporated into domestic law first.  
Europeanization refers to a number of slightly different phenomena that are located on at 
least four distinct political levels. Attention is particularly placed on the influence of 
supranational institutions such as the EU and the decisions made at the European level on 
national politics and structures (Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Börzel and Risse 2000, Green, 
Cowles et al 2001; Schmidt 2002). The central contention in much of the current research is that 
implementation is eased the more EU policies ‗fit‘ existing national policy. Empirical 
investigation into this alignment argument has been restricted to case studies, simply as a result 
of the difficulty posed by measuring the compatibility of EU legislation with existing domestic 
policies and structures of the member states. 
In regards to the ‗fit‘ and ‗misfit‘ distinction, ―adjustment processes are expected to be 
more problematic if the degree of misfit between European rules and existing institutional and 
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regulatory traditions is high‖ (Falkner, Treib, et al, 2004, 11). In these cases where misfit results, 
national governments, parliaments, and administrations are equally expected to act as ―guardians 
of the status quo, as the shield protecting national legal-administrative traditions‖ against conflict 
from the European supranational level of governance (Duina, 1997). Thus, according to Falkner 
and Treib, deliberate opposition of national veto players during any form of compliance may be 
expected in the context of Europeanization, if there is enough ‗misfit‘. With the degree of 
‗misfit‘ with new EU standards, the implementation of European directives seems to confront 
two political systems. This coincides with the perspective that EU is a federal institution with 
two disparate levels of government — national and supranational.  
The institutional ‗fit‘ or ‗misfit‘ between European rules and existing national ones has 
been interpreted as one of the central factors that determine overall implementation performance. 
Some studies have stressed the salience of institutional ‗fit‘ or ‗misfit‘ (i.e., the actual degree of 
compatibility or incompatibility between EU policies and national legislative or administrative 
structures) (Knill and Lenschow 2000a; Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 2001). This strand of 
literature shares the view that there is some degree of compatibility between domestic actors and 
other entities. In addition, this misfit-centered approach has suggested numerous mediating 
factors, which may lead to an adaptation of policy changes despite the possibility of 
incompatibility. These factors include institutional decision-making structures, such as veto 
players.     
 A possible explanation for non-compliance in the Europeanization literature relates to a 
member state‘s lack of willingness or capacity to implement a particular piece of legislation 
(Tallberg, 2002). This argument would suggest potentially divergent policy preferences between 
the EU level and the domestic level. In addition, some of the literature focuses on the actor-
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oriented view on preferences and argues that domestic opposition to a directive or regulation 
among distinct domestic players contributes to non-compliance. We would expect 
Europeanization, therefore, to have a positive impact on compliance.  If the conventional 
approaches to EU integration and policy-making do not fully account for the varying rates of 
compliance among member states, then what does?  
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II. Veto Player Theory 
Most theoretical approaches to European integration imply overall compliance by 
member states, but do not provide fully adequate accounts of non-compliance. Therefore, I 
believe the theory of veto players may provide a more compelling explanation as to the 
variations in compliance that exists between member states. It draws upon the theory of veto 
players, identified most closely with political scientist George Tsebelis. Tsebelis defines veto 
players as simply the individuals or collective bodies that must agree to any policy change before 
it is adopted. The failure of these entities to accept a policy change effectively amounts to a veto 
of the policy proposal. Tsebelis argues that political systems with large numbers of veto players 
are likely to have much policy stability, since one or more veto players is likely to prevent major 
policy changes.  
Generally, parliamentary systems have fewer veto players than presidential systems and 
unicameral (single-chamber) legislative bodies have fewer veto players than bicameral 
legislatures. Although the institutional structure of any given country is vital in order to assess 
how many veto players exist within the policy-making process, Tsebelis contends that other 
criteria must be assessed as well. This includes examining the political party system and the 
ideological divisions that separate the main parties. For instance, if the president is from the 
same party as the party in control of the legislature, there could be fewer veto players compared 
to a parliamentary system fractured into a coalition of small parties with divergent policy 
preferences, termed ―partisan veto players‖.  
 Tsebelis argues that in order to change policies or the legislative status quo, a particular 
number of individual or collective actors have to agree to the proposed change. Typically, veto 
players are either specified in constitutions or located in the overall political systems (i.e., 
15 
 
various parties that form a state‘s coalition government). Tsebelis thus distinguishes between 
into ‗institutional‘ and ‗partisan‘ veto players (Tsebelis, 2002, 79). The central argument of veto 
player theory is that the number and interest-ideological polarization of policy-making players, 
whose approval is required to alter the policy status quo — i.e., of veto players — reduces the 
probability of (agreement upon enacting) policy change and/or the (maximum possible) 
magnitude of policy change. The size of the win-set (W[SQ])
4
 of the status quo shrinks as the 
number or polarization of veto players increases. Thus, as the win-set of the status quo expands 
(as the number and/or polarization of veto players declines), the veto player theory predicts a 
greater range of possible policy-changes, suggesting that as the expected policy-change 
increases, the variance of policy and policy-change increases. Conversely, as the win-set 
diminishes (i.e., the number and/or polarization of veto players expands), the less likely a policy-
change is to result (Tsebelis, 1995, 289-326).  
Tsebelis identifies what counts as a veto player by several broad criteria such as 1) the 
electoral system of a state (majoritarian v. proportional), 2) parliamentary v. presidential, 3) 
federalism v. bicameralism, 4) constitutional rules and the jurisdiction of constitutional courts. 
First, if a country‘s constitution identifies individual or collective actors that are required to 
agree for a change of the status quo, then those are counted as institutional veto players. 
Therefore, the level of centralization of any government is examined in order to count how many 
veto players there are. This becomes quite simple for a unicameral parliamentary system (such as 
Denmark or Greece, for instance, and the United Kingdom for purposes of this thesis) when the 
constitution does not specifically define other veto players as there is only one defined veto 
player. It is clear through empirical evidence that political parties in parliamentary democracies 
are much more disciplined than those in presidential systems. The literature often finds that in 
                                                        
4
 The shared winset of outcomes which meet each veto player‘s requirement of being superior to the status quo. 
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electoral systems where candidates compete for a personal vote from the electorate, they are 
more likely to heed the demands of their constituency than that of their political party, which is 
an example of what occurs in most presidential systems. Therefore, political party discipline is 
likely to be significantly higher than in electoral systems without personal votes from the 
electorate (Carey and Shugart, 1995). From this perspective, variables such as political party 
cohesion, unicameral and bicameral institutional structures, and presidential or parliamentary 
systems must all be considered jointly in examining the number of veto players a country may 
have.  
Second, whether a coalition government exists is important. Several assumptions can be 
made based on the information available (if not stated in a constitution) — if a single party 
controls the government, this party ―is by definition the only veto player in the political 
system…it can implement any policy change it wishes, and no policy change that this party 
disagrees with will be implemented‖ (Tsebelis, 2002, 78). The number of veto players may be 
difficult to determine, however, simply because political parties may lose majorities, split, merge 
— all of which impact the final number of veto players. Tsebelis suggests that a five-party 
parliament in a unicameral parliamentary system may act a certain way based on the constitution 
of the member state. Assuming that the five political parties are rather cohesive and that any 
three of them can control a majority, significant variations can result in defining which entity has 
the most power. Tsebelis explains that three individual veto players may reduce a win-set of the 
status quo compared to one collective veto player.  
Third, whether a country has a judiciary that can interpret and overrule statute based on 
disagreement over constitutionality or some other legal precedent that can also be counted as a 
veto player. As Tsebelis explains in his analysis of the judiciary as a possible veto actor, there is 
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a distinction in comparative law between countries with legal traditions of common law and civil 
law. In common law countries (i.e., the United Kingdom and its former colonies such as the 
United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland), laws are seen not solely as acts of the 
legislature, but rather as the accumulation of rulings and interpretations by judges.  The 
importance of precedent in the common law tradition allows for the judiciary to effectively act as 
a veto player. Although technically the judiciary of any given common law country is not a veto 
player, since it can be overruled by legislation, the opposite is true with respect to the 
constitutional interpretation of any law. A rejection by a constitutional court (such as the U.S. 
Supreme Court) does effectively abrogate legislation approved by the legislature and are 
consequently veto players.  
In summary, veto player theory focuses on legislative politics and how lawmaking 
decisions are made in order to explain a set of policies. The number of institutional veto players 
can differ based on regime type. Whether a country has a presidential or parliamentary system as 
well as who controls the legislative agenda and by how much impact veto player configuration 
(Tsebelis, 2002, 284). Federal and unitary countries can also differ in the number of institutional 
veto players. Multiparty coalitions and single political party governments also differ in the 
number of partisan veto players. In addition, strong and weak political parties differ in party 
cohesion which inevitably affects the number of institutional veto players. These variables 
suggest that all political systems differ in the number of veto players, which inevitably impacts 
policy stability. Since veto player theory places its focus on the legislative process of individual 
countries, predictions about policy outcomes can be determined. For instance, if a state contains 
multiple veto players, then it can be assumed that changing the legislative status quo will be 
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more difficult. Therefore, this would assume that the more veto players an EU member state 
contains, the less likely that state is to be compliant.  
 In conclusion, the variety of theoretical arguments rooted in Neofuctionalisim, 
Intergovernmentalisim, and Europeanization does not seem sufficient to explain why there are 
variations between member states in compliance. The expectation provided by Neofuctionalisim 
and Europeanization is that member states should be compliant due to the increasing 
convergence of policy-making at the supranational level rather than the domestic level. Based on 
the data of compliance among member states, however, this does not seem to be the case. The 
variations in compliance among member states are rather significant. My explanation is that veto 
players may perhaps explain these variations. In the next section of this thesis, I illustrate 
through statistical methods that this is indeed the case.  
19 
 
III. Data Analysis 
In this section, I present empirical evidence on veto players and compliance in the EU. I 
first discuss my data on the number of infringement cases brought against fifteen member states 
by the European Commission and the ECJ and the number of veto players in each of these fifteen 
member states for the years 1997-2008, before discussing the findings of my statistical analysis. I 
use both cross-tabulations and regression models in order to test the accuracy of my hypothesis.  
All three stages of the EU‘s official procedure to determine whether a member state is 
non-compliant are laid down in Article 226 of the European Community Treaty (ECT). These 
stages include the posting of a letter of formal notice to the member state in question, a reasoned 
opinion by the European Commission that states the act of non-compliance and includes an 
elaborate description of the violation the member state has committed, and finally the opening of 
an ECJ court case against the suspected violator that is to determine whether the member state in 
question is compliant or not. One way that the Commission classifies infringements is member 
states‘ failures to notify that individual directives have been transposed (i.e., incorporated into 
national law by national legislatures or other veto players) by the set deadline as determined by 
the directive itself, which is adopted by the Council and the Parliament. Veto players, according 
to my hypothesis, would delay or even prevent transposition of EU directives, therefore causing 
non-compliance.  
 My dependent variable is the number of infringement cases per member state and year. It 
is operationalized by the number of times a member state is deemed non-compliant by the 
Commission and the ECJ each year. If a member state has a lower number of infringement cases, 
it can be considered to have a higher rate of non-compliance than a member state that has more 
infringement cases. 
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  For the period 1997 to 2008, four member states, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, 
accounted for over 45 percent of all infringement proceedings in the EU. In other words, the 
available data on infringements of Community law reveal that these founding member states are 
consistently responsible for close to half of all infringement cases. This suggests that the 
implementation deficit is not an EU-wide problem, but rather seems to be a problem only 
associated with certain member states. It is clear that these numbers do not support the view that 
there is a generic problem with directives themselves, but rather highlight that the causes of non-
compliance are located in the national arena.  
As I mentioned in the previous paragraph, some of the original or older member states are 
amongst the worst violators. Therefore, inexperience or unfamiliarity with EU rules and 
regulations is not a plausible explanation for why member states are consistent infringers. In 
addition, it is not the case that the countries in question are persistently outvoted in the Council 
of Ministers and are forced to adopt directives they are less inclined to support (Falkner, Treib, et 
al, 2004). If one of the fifteen member states did not want to adopt something, they would make 
their preference clear. In fact, some of the non-compliant members are often at the forefront of 
initiating directives in their favor. Therefore, it is unlikely that the problem is of being on the 
losing side at the decision-making supranational level. That is why I argue that is the problem 
has to lie at the national level, and the number of domestic veto players can determine whether a 
member state is more compliant or not.  
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Table 1. New EU Infringement Cases per Member State, 1997-2008 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals 
Belgium  19 22 13 5 13 8 17 13 8 11 10 17 137 
Denmark  0 1 1 0 2 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 14 
Germany  20 5 9 12 13 16 18 14 13 11 15 10 156 
Ireland  6 10 13 14 12 8 16 3 9 7 10 19 127 
Greece  10 17 12 18 15 17 16 27 18 25 26 21 222 
Spain  7 6 7 9 15 11 28 11 6 19 21 15 155 
France  15 22 35 25 20 22 22 23 11 9 14 10 228 
Italy  20 12 29 22 21 24 20 27 36 25 23 17 276 
Luxembourg  8 8 14 11 10 12 16 14 19 28 20 15 175 
Netherlands  3 3 1 12 5 5 9 13 8 5 8 4 76 
Austria  0 4 8 8 7 15 20 14 9 12 6 10 113 
Portugal  15 5 13 10 7 10 10 7 7 13 23 14 134 
Finland  0 1 0 4 3 1 6 8 10 7 2 5 47 
Sweden  0 1 1 3 3 2 5 5 5 4 10 6 45 
United 
Kingdom  1 1 6 4 11 15 8 12 7 4 2 13 84 
EU 15 (Total) 124 118 162 157 157 168 214 193 169 180 190 176 1884 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
As one can see in table 1, it is clear that the fifteen member states are fairly consistent in 
their infringement behavior over the time period of eleven years. Although it would be 
interesting to also analyze the ten newest member states from central, eastern, and, southern 
Europe that joined the EU in 2004 and to compare their compliance rates to those of the older 
member states, I had to exclude the new member states due to missing data. That is why I am left 
with fifteen EU member states and the time period of 1997-2008. Together, these fifteen member 
states and eleven years form the largest available balanced panel of EU compliance data.  
Graph 1 presents the average annual number of infringement cases from 1997-2008 for 
each of the fifteen member states. It is sorted by the number of infringements and clearly 
illustrates the variation in infringements between the member states. Taking a closer look at the 
ranking of countries, we can observe an interesting geographic clustering of member states. The 
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Nordic countries Denmark, Sweden, and Finland have the lowest number of infringement cases, 
whereas Italy, France, and Greece ‗lead‘ with the most number of infringement cases.  
 
Graph 1. Average Annual Number of EU Infringement Cases (per member state) 1997-2008) 
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Data source: Eurostat. 
 
As the dependent variable, the average number of infringement cases per year illustrates 
the considerable variation that exists between member states on an annual basis. The average 
number of infringement cases was calculated by taking the number of each member state through 
the years 1997-2008 and placing them in order from most compliant (Denmark, which violates 
EU law one to three times on average) to least compliant (Italy, which has the highest level of 
non-compliance, significantly greater than any other member state on average). In examining the 
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mean numbers presented in this graph, we see extensive variation in infringements of the 
member states.  
Graph 2. Histogram of the Annual Number of Infringement Cases, 1997-2008 
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Graph 2 displays the frequencies of infringement cases for the fifteen member states over 
the time period 1997-2008. On the x-axis, the number of annual infringement cases is listed (0 
through 40) and the frequency of the occurrence can be read off on the y-axis. For most member 
states and years, the number of infringement cases is in the 1-16 range, with particularly many in 
the 10-14 range and 0-2 range.  
To test my hypothesis that veto players are responsible for variation in non-compliance 
across the member states, I developed my own veto player index, which counts the number of 
veto players in each of the fifteen member states on an annual basis for the years 1997-2008. The 
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coding scheme of veto players is based on a number of factors, which includes unicameral (1 
veto player) vs. bicameral legislatures (2 veto players), the power of a president or prime 
minister to veto legislation (1 veto player), and the power of opposition parties, particularly in 
country-years with coalition governments (based on Hunt and Laver‘s mean index scale of the 
power of opposition parties, which is also included in my analysis as a separate control variable).  
Although there is little variation from year to year for most member states, there were 
changes in the number of veto players in France (cohabitation with during Chriac‘s second term 
in office from 1997-2002) and Italy (during Prodi‘s Government from 2006 to 2008). The 
average annual number of veto players per member state based on my coding scheme for the 
years 1997-2008 is illustrated in graph 3.  
In the coding process, veto players that could be directly involved with vetoing EU 
directives were coded for. Those that did not have any veto power were not included in my 
coding scheme. Therefore, my coding scheme only references the number of veto players that are 
involved in the transposition of EU directives in each member state. For instance, although a 
member state may have localities, regions, or states that may have the power to veto domestic 
legislation; they may not have that power when it comes to EU law. Thus, they are not included 
in my original coding scheme.  
 
 
25 
 
Graph 3. Average Number of Veto Players  
0
2
4
6
8
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 V
e
to
 P
la
y
e
rs
 (
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r)
Fi
nl
an
d
S
w
ed
en
D
en
m
ar
k
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
Ire
la
nd
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
P
or
tu
ga
l
A
us
tri
a
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
S
pa
in
B
el
gi
um
G
re
ec
e
Ita
ly
 
 
Inspecting graph 3, it becomes clear that Italy has the highest number of veto players 
(anywhere from 7-9 veto players) and Finland, with its unicameral parliament and a president 
who cannot veto legislation, has the least with only one veto player per year on average, tied 
with Sweden. Especially in the regression analysis, I include additional independent variables 
besides my own veto player index (Veto Players 1). The first group of independent variables is 
related to domestic political constraints. The variable Veto Players 2 is based Tsebelis‘s coding 
scheme. Veto Players 3, on the other hand, is based on a veto player-like index developed by 
Witold Henisz. This variable measures the political constraints of government actors in any 
given year by examining the political and economic determinants of substantive changes in 
government policy (Henisz, 2006).  
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix of the Three Veto Player Indices 
 Veto Players 1 Veto Players 2 Veto Players 3 
Veto Players 1 1.0000   
Veto Players 2 (Tsebelis) 0.4936 1.0000  
Veto Players 3 (Henisz) 0.1260 0.4419 1.0000 
 
Table 2 is a correlation matrix of the three veto player indices discussed above. 
Comparing my index to the one by Tsebelis, we find a fairly high correlation of .49. However, 
when comparing my index to Henisz‘s index of political constraints, the correlation is only .12. 
This clearly indicates that the three veto player indices capture different aspects of political 
constraints. On the positive side, this should erase the possible problems of multicollinearity, 
which can occur when two independent variables are very highly correlated with one another. 
Since this correlation matrix suggests that the correlation between my index and the ones by  
Tsebelis and Henisz is less than .5, multicollinearity should not become an issue in the regression 
analysis. It even becomes possible to estimate regression models that control for two or all veto 
player coding schemes at the same time (cf. regression models 7-9 in table 5).  
The remaining independent variables are, first, Laver and Hunt‘s opposition party mean 
scale index (Opposition Party Impact), which tests for effects of the power of opposition parties 
on member states‘ compliance records. I expect that the higher the impact that opposition parties 
have on a member state government, the less likely compliance is to occur. Second, the general 
public support of the EU (EU support) is measured by opinion poll data from the years 1997-
2008.
5
 The hypothesis behind the inclusion of this control variable is that if the general public in 
a member state is more supportive of EU policies, the member state will in turn be more 
                                                        
5
 Poll results from European Commission taken from the dates November 1997, November 1998, November 1999,  
June 2000, November 2001, May 2002, and April 2004. The survey question asked of participants was, ―Taking 
everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a 
member of the European Community (Common Market)?” 
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compliant. Third, I include the variable GDP per capita to test whether the financial capability of 
member states makes them more compliant with EU law. While I expect that more GDP per 
capita leads to better compliance records, it could also be that the relative poor member states 
have stronger incentives to comply. After all, the strict financial penalties that the ECJ can 
impose on member states for non-compliance should be a stronger deterrent for the poor member 
states than those, which can afford to pay such penalties. Fourth, I include the independent 
variable trade openness (Trade) that measures the importance of trade for each member state. It 
is calculated by dividing total trade, i.e., imports plus exports, by GDP. I expect that the 
importance of trade for a member state has an impact on whether or not this member state 
violates European law. For instance, if a member state is more reliant on trade with its EU 
neighbors, it should be interested in further integration and, thus, comply at higher rates than 
member states that rely less on trade with their fellow member states. Finally, the variable 
Population controls for the number of people that lived in a member state during the time period 
1997-2008. I expect member states with larger populations to have higher rates of compliance 
simply because they have more representation at the EU level. This holds particularly true for the 
European Parliament, since population by and large determines the number of seats a member 
state is given.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables discussed above. The reduced 
number of observations for Tsebelis‘s veto player index (Veto Players 2) as well as the Trade 
variable is due to missing data.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 Country 
years 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable:      
Infringements 180 11.16 7.64 0.00 36.00 
Independent variables:      
Veto Players 1 180 3.50 1.65 1.00 8.00 
Veto Players 2  156 2.77 1.65 1.00 6.00 
Veto Players 3 180 .49 .10 .25 .72 
Population (in mill.) 180 25.45 26.08 .42 82.54 
GDP per capita 180 24164.31 8816.30 9867.72 56189.02 
Trade 164 97.37 58.88 46.59 314.44 
EU Support 180 .55 .17 .20 .89 
Opposition Party Impact 180 3.97 1.47 2.00 7.10 
 
Table 4. Cross-Tabulation of Veto Players and Infringements 
  Veto Players 1:   
Infringements: Few Average Many Total 
Few 12 20 0 32 
 (6.67) (11.11)   
Average 12 101 2 115 
 (6.67) (56.11) (1.11)  
Many  0 23 10 33 
  (12.78) (5.56)  
Total 24 144 12 180 
Cross-Tabulation of veto players and infringements (frequencies with cell percentages in parentheses) Note: Few 
infringements/veto players equals mean minus one standard deviation and less. Many infringements/veto players 
equals mean plus one standard deviation and more.   
 
 Table 4 cross-tabulates the number of infringements and veto players based on the data 
collected for the years 1997-2008. The table illustrates that member states with few veto players 
have few infringements. On the other hand, if a member state has many veto players, that state 
has many infringements. In addition, if member states have a more average number of veto 
players, they are also likely to have an average number of infringements against them. The 
combination average-average accounts for 56.11% of the total number of infringement cases 
examined during the time period between the years 1997-2008. Based on the data for these years, 
it is clear that if a member state has few veto players (according to my veto player index), it will 
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not have many infringements. Conversely, many infringements for a member state are a fairly 
reliable indicator for it having many domestic veto players.  
 
Graph 4. Scatter Plot of Veto Players and Infringement Cases 
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Scatter Plot with Linear Prediction (i.e., Regression Curve) 
 
 Graph 4 depicts a scatter plot of my veto player index on the x-axis and the number of 
infringement cases for each member state and year on the y-axis. In addition, it includes the 
regression curve, which has a strong positive slope. Even without the regression curve, it is 
immediately evident from this graph that as the number of veto players increase in any given 
state, the number of infringement cases against them increases as well. This graphical evidence 
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further supports my hypothesis that if the number of veto players in a member state increases, the 
number of infringement violations increases and compliance with the EU declines.  
 
Table 5. Regression Analysis of Veto Players and Infringement Rates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Veto Players 1 3.037*** 3.080*** 2.788*** 2.966*** 
 (0.307) (0.334) (0.340) (0.571) 
Veto Players 2     
     
Veto Players 3     
     
Population (in mill.)   0.066* 0.051 
   (0.036) (0.038) 
GDP per capita   0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade   0.008 -0.004 
   (0.039) (0.043) 
EU Support   4.868 5.281 
   (6.061) (5.860) 
Opposition Party Impact    -0.411 
    (0.613) 
Constant 0.527 2.395 -3.009 -2.696 
 (1.315) (1.616) (5.951) (5.988) 
Year controls  no yes yes yes 
Observations 180 180 164 164 
Adjusted R-squared 0.428 0.459 0.492 0.493 
OLS regression with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering on member states; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
31 
 
Table 5. Regression Analysis of Veto Players and Infringement Rates (continued)  
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Veto Players 1   2.428*** 3.143*** 2.648*** 
   (0.746) (0.466) (0.544) 
Veto Players 2 0.568  -0.002  0.680 
 (1.022)  (0.860)  (0.650) 
Veto Players 3  -18.390*  -23.213** -25.406*** 
  (9.911)  (7.982) (7.949) 
Population (in mill.) 0.217*** 0.177** 0.105* 0.030 0.056 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.054) (0.039) (0.044) 
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade 0.110* 0.110** 0.036 0.029 0.042 
 (0.059) (0.048) (0.062) (0.034) (0.044) 
EU Support -0.484 3.691 1.638 -1.414 -0.008 
 (13.526) (8.683) (9.372) (5.891) (7.871) 
Opposition Party Impact 1.478 1.046 0.285 -0.146 -0.136 
 (1.289) (1.115) (1.185) (0.486) (0.851) 
Constant -3.582 15.114 -6.983 11.359 6.738 
 (7.201) (9.162) (5.999) (7.491) (7.399) 
Year controls  yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 142 164 142 164 142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.360 0.332 0.451 0.550 0.511 
OLS regression with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and clustering on member states; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
The number of infringement cases is the dependent variable in all nine regression models 
of table 5. In model 1 of the regression analysis, we see a positive and significant coefficient for 
my coding of veto players. Indeed, even when I include additional independent variables in the 
regression model (models 3-4), my veto player variable remains positive and highly statistically 
significant. This is even the case when the two veto player indices by Tsebelis and Henisz are 
included in the regression for the purposes of assessing the robustness of the effect of my own 
veto player variable on non-compliance (models 7-9).  
The only other independent variable that is consistently significant is Population (models 
3, 5, 6, and 7). However, the algebraic sign of the coefficient is counterintuitive. Larger member 
states seem to violate European law more frequently, even though they have more influence in 
the decision-making process than smaller member states. The variables GDP and Trade are only 
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statistically significant in models 5 and 6, and the other control variables seem to have no impact 
on the number of infringement cases at all.  
Based on my statistical analyses, I can conclude that veto players have a positive and 
significant impact on the number of infringements by member states. In other words, as the 
number of veto players increases in a member state, more violations of Community law are 
committed by that particular member state, even when controlling for large variety of 
independent variables. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 This thesis has examined the variations of compliance among fifteen EU member states 
for the years 1997-2008. Most theoretical approaches to European integration imply overall 
compliance by member states, but do not provide fully adequate accounts of non-compliance. I 
have formulated a hypothesis that provides an adequate explanation as to why these variations 
exist. The hypothesis posits that the more veto players a member state contains; the less likely 
they are to be compliant. Based on statistical modeling, veto players do indeed have a positive 
and significant impact on the compliance rates of member states.  
 The three political constraint indices were all highly significant, even when all variables 
were controlled for in the regression model. This is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that 
veto players, as a measure of domestic political constraint, inevitably impact rates of compliance 
among the member states. EU public support does not appear to have a direct effect on the 
infringement rates of member states. Therefore, I can also conclude that Euroscepticism among 
the citizens of a member state has little to no impact on whether a member state may be 
compliant or not.  
 My research into this policy-making dilemma raises many questions regarding the 
implementation of directives into the domestic law of the member states. The complexity of 
numerous EU rules, which in itself can make implementation difficult for the member states, is 
reinforced by the fact that all directives require transposition into the national law by member 
states. For this reason it has been suggested by some reformists of the current status quo that the 
implementation of EU law and policies would be improved if the there was more reliance on 
regulations (which automatically become law once enacted by the EU) and less on directives 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, 255). This policy would seem to be quite plausible if implemented 
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correctly. For instance, transposition inevitably introduces an extra stage in the process of 
applying EU rules and standards. At the minimum, transposition will cause delay, which affects 
the entire Union.  
 In addition to these implementation dilemmas, newly established procedures as mandated 
by directives may suffer from ―inherent weakness‖ (Nicolaides, Oberg, 2006). Given that 
directives have this inherent weakness in force, the solution to these problems appears to be quite 
simple — just eliminate the requirement to transpose directives entirely. This is a strong 
argument in favor of this change, particularly as some feel that regulations must be applied 
uniformly by all member states. This raises an important question — does the discretion of the 
legal instrument weaken or strengthen the compliance of member states with the detailed 
requirements of EU law?  
 It is unlikely that the requirement of the transposition of directives will be discontinued. 
Even if that were the case, and directives would not be required to be transposed, ―legal and 
institutional adaptation and innovation within member states will not be avoided‖ (Ibid).  
Possibly in an effort to induce member states to comply with their obligations as mandated by 
treaty obligations, the Commission recently has adopted a policy of tougher penalties for 
infringements of non-compliance. Despite this, some scholars continue argue that perhaps a more 
stringent approach may not be an effective deterrent to non-compliance (Shavell, 2004). 
 A growing body of literature suggests applying economic concepts to the assessment of 
law suggests that rational agents would comply with costly rules only if non-compliance of EU 
directives would be more costly (Friedman, 2000). This would be the case whenever the penalty 
for non-compliance is larger than the fiscal sum required for compliance (Friedman, 2000). 
Assuming that member states act as rational agents base on this theoretical approach, the choice 
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of legal instrument by the EU must be irrelevant to the willingness of member states to abide by 
law set by the Union as long as there is no effect either on the probability of detection or the size 
of the penalty for particular infringements. Generally, penalties for infringements are determined 
according to the severity of the violation of EU law and the length of that violation. Since the 
severity appears to be independent of the actual form of the legal instrument, it follows that the 
most salient factor that could influence the behavior of member states is the possibility of 
detection of a violation (Mastenbroek, 2005, 1107).  
 It is expected that all EU member states will have their own views on how EU legislation 
should be implemented, commencing with the process of transposition. The various policy 
preferences from among member states may provide an additional explanation in the variations 
that exist in compliance. Decision-making is inevitably a multi-level process in which many 
domestic actors are involved. Therefore, it is clear that national contexts are necessary in 
examining the compliance rates of EU member states. Since the record among all member states 
is imperfect as judged by the number of infringement cases that come up each year, one can 
assume that legal action against non-complying member states is the clear solution. What may 
happen if the EU only relied on the legal proceedings initiated by the Commission in order to 
induce member states to respect their obligations? This question obviously has significant impact 
on the policy-making process across the EU.  
 In conclusion, my research suggests that several indicators must be examined in order to 
determine whether a member state is compliant with EU law. The variety of theoretical 
arguments rooted in Neofuctionalisim, Intergovernmentalisim, and Europeanization does not 
seem sufficient to explain why there are variations among member states in compliance. The 
expectation provided by Neofuctionalisim, Europeanization, and to some extent, 
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Intergovernmentalism is that member states should be compliant due to the increasing 
convergence of policy-making at the supranational level rather than the domestic level. This does 
not seem to be the case based on the data of compliance between member states however. Veto 
player theory provides a sufficient explanation to account for the variations among member 
states. Since veto player theory places its focus on the legislative process of individual countries, 
predictions about policy outcomes can be determined. For example, if a state contains multiple 
veto players, then it can be assumed that changing the legislative status quo will be more 
difficult. Therefore, this would suggest that the more veto players a member state contains, the 
less likely they are to be compliant, which is evident in the testing of my hypothesis. 
 My findings may have implications for future interpretations of the theoretical arguments 
associated with European integration, since a number of these theories do not take into account 
the extent of the variations of compliance among member states. The implications of non-
compliance have yet to be fully elaborated in the context of Neofuctionalisim, 
Intergovernmentalisim, and Europeanization, which seek to explain how and why integration 
takes place. As a unique component of EU decision-making, directives have blurred the 
traditional political and policy-making boundaries at the supranational and domestic level. As a 
result of my research, emphasis should be placed domestic political actors, such as veto players, 
in examining the overall compliance of EU member states.   
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